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Introduction
Sub-^saharan . Africa is characterized by widespread poverty and 
rapid population growth. Millions of Africans today are 
malnourished, and maniy more, perhaps 100 million or'more, would 
eat better if they could (.Rotberg, 1983). The 1960's mark the 
beginning of a striking decline in the region's ability, to 
produce or purchase sufficient food for the needs o f ’ its 
population. The trend over the past two decades has-been a 
continuing per, capita fall and, in some countries, . an absolute 
fall in food production.
The reasons underlying the African food crisis, as it has become 
known, have been the subject of widespread analysis and debate, 
ranging across the entire specturum of political, institutional 
and techno1ogica1 . alternatives. As African nations have moved 
into independence, , they have . adopted, in varying degrees, an 
. increased emphasis on the importance of smallholder agriculture. 
Although large-scale - private.and state farms form a significant 
bloc in many African agricu 1 tura.l economic sectors, their number 
and influence, are declining relative to the smallholder sub­
sector. Even at present it is unlikely that more ..than five 
percent of sub-Saharan food production: comes from large-scale 
farms. The area in large-scale production is . relatively small 
and - its expansion is both .technica11y difficult and politically 
impossible (Mel lor, Delgado and Blackie, 1986).. Inefficient 
marketing and distorted prices have been identified as a major 
cause of the decline in per capita productivity of African 
agriculture. In many cases these problems are attributed to 
the state marketing systems which are designed to service large- 
scale producers and/or urban consumers, being expected to serve., 
the small-scale sector.
The commodity focus of this.paper is maize; an important food 
crop over much of Sub-Saharan Africa and which forms 40’/. or more 
of the national diet in. East and Southern Africa.. The analysis 
will concentrate on Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
State Intervention in Maize Marketing ,
There is a long history in Africa of official and quasi-official 
'single channel' (i.e monblpson is tic ) food marketing agencies. 
Jones (1982) ■ gives the following summary of arguments.used to 
defend the continuing survival of official food marketing 
agencies despite the ' cohsiderable evidence of their poor 
performance: . ’
1. Marketing and storing kgricultural produce is a technically 
complicated . business,!, and requires a highly qualified and 
technically well-equipped agency so as to avoid waste.
2. There are important economies of scale' in transport and'' 
storage which only a sole buyer and seller can realise. \
■!
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: , 3 . Private sector 
leading to lower 
consumers.
■food marketing involves many 
prices to -farmers, and higher
midd1emen, 
prices to
4. Dea1ers wi11 ■ form a 'ring' to cheat f.arjmer s .i ‘ '
5. Official marketing channels are |necessary to limit price
fluc tuati ons. ;
6. Official 
smugg1ing
. marketing channels are. inecessary
i
to prevent
1
Jones (198^) points out that there is considerable evidence that 
the involvement o-f the state in primary agricultural marketing 
has , placed an enormous burden on the economies of African states. 
Ahmed* and Rustagi (1985) explore the injterre 1 ations between 
agricultural prices and market systems''. , \ They note that the 
efficiency of marketing institutions, including infrustruetura1 
facilities, influences directly both producer and consumer 
prices. Their analysis shows that farmers in Africa receive a 
smaller proportion of the price paid by final' consumers .of 
foodgrains in.Africa than do.farmers in Asia. Based on data from 
selected .African ; countries, they suggest that the average 
producer price in Africa is only 35 - 607. of the terminal market 
price; this contrasts markedly with the 75 - 907. received by 
farmers in^sel'ected Asian countries. Furthermore the ..high cost 
of marketing in Africa cannot be attributed either to increased 
utility of marketing or ’to more sophisticated marketing 
services. Two major cast centres affect the wider price spread 
in Africa as opposed to Asia,:'
1. Transport and associated marketing costs explain 397. of the 
differential in marketing margins between African and Asian 
countries.
2. A further 277. of the differences in marketing margin can be 
explained by the transaction costs associated with public 
marketing.
Despite these discouraging data, the bias towards state marketing 
systems persists, (see Eicher and Baker, 1982, for a summary of 
the literature on food grain marketing in Africa). Ahmed and 
Rustagi observe that the, mix of large-scale estates and peasant 
farms, typical of much of Southern, and Eastern Africa, is, to 
some extent, responsible for the continuing reliance on state 
marketing in this part of the 'region. In West Africa, the 
driving . fdree may , be the concern of governments to increase 
market access but without using or relying on, the traditional 
market .system. 1 Their' reluctance to utilise the existing network 
of markets may be, at least in; part, a reaction against 
domination of the marketing system by foreign or politically 
opposed groups (Abbott, 1987). Smallholders face 'thin' markets,
which are unstable, and " difficu1t to develop.. Government 
intervention becomes a, natural choice "to rectify the problem, 
although ironically, such intervention often serves only to 
'thin', the market further. If the smallholder sector is to 
participate fully in hational economies greater access to markets 
and better market integration is essential.
The Debate on Marketing and Pricing of Fpodgrains in Africa .
An important focus of the debate on the underlying causes of 
Africa's economic decline ovejr the past few decades has been on 
the role of agricultural prices and markets. Two seminal 
documents; have been the Lagos Plan of Action adopted by an 
extraordinary session of Heads of State and ^Government of the 
Organisation of African Uni ty-^ C OAU) in 1980, and the World Bank's 
Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa published in 1981.
While the, concerns addressed by both these documents have much in
common, and there is 
policy agenda, there are 
manner in which policy, 
and Cummings . (1984 for a
the two documents)
evidence of consensus on the necessary 
important strategic differences in the 
reform.should be implemented (see Browne 
full review,of _ the differences between 
The Lagos Plan calls for food self- 
sufficiency, together with an emphasis on integrated rural 
development as an overall strategy. Particular support'is to be 
given, to smal1 holder organisations and cooperatives. The World
Bank report (commonly termed the Berg report) emphasizes the 
privatisation of economic activities in agriculture, a strategy 
of comparative advantage, the development of areas of highest 
potential, and land registration schemes aimed at converting 
communally owned land to. private ownership. Agricultural pricing 
and marketing are dealt with at some length in the Berg report', 
and have been the subject of continuing debate. The thesis of 
the Berg report is that the government controlled pricing and 
marketing structures adopted by many African countries have acted 
as-a serious drag on the development of agriculture. Given the 
predominance of the agriculture sector in the economies of most 
African nations, this has served to depress - overall economic 
growth to an unacceptable degree. With particular reference to 
food policy, the Berg report points out:
"In most African countries, producer and consumer prices for 
basic foodstuffs are legally controlled. Governments have 
dual policy objectives^ in setting and regulating their 
prices. They want to provide adequate incentives for 
increasing food production, and ; they seek to protect the 
interests of consumers ait the same time. In practice, the. 
objective, of ensuring -fa ‘.regular supply of staples at 
•“ affordable' . prices for- consumers has been the dominant
i
4most countries.criterion in
various ways: producer p'rices are
levels; subsidies are provided by 
below landed costs; 
domestic -food price 
given an implicit . 
overvaluation."
This is accomplished in 
-fixed at b.elo.w market 
selling imported -foods at 
■food imports are encouraged when 
levels rise; and imported -foods are 
subsidy because o-f currency
Indeed, the Lagos Plan o-f Action does strongly recommend both 
adequate incentive prices -fori -food, production, particularly by 
smallholders, as. well as pricing -food at levels affordable by
both the rural and the urban .poor. There is much debate as to
whether the privatisation of! economic activities in agriculture 
(as recommended by the Berg report) and thej emphasis on pricing 
policy will bring, -forth the necessary output i from smallholders in 
Africa. Ghai and Lawrence (1986) from an analysis of ILO and FAQV | •data conclude that, for many African countries, producer prices 
for major food crops kept pace with the rate of increase in the 
consumer price index over . the 1970s. They recognize, however,, 
that the data ha\le considerable limitations I and that it is not 
passible to tell to what ^ extent these price series ref lect
official prices, or whether actual prices exc'eed official prices.. 
Criticism of the approach . advocated in (the Berg report is
reviewed fully in Browne and JCummings (1984) and does not require 
further elaboration here. What is of significance, is that the 
privatisation of marketing proposed by Berg pas, indeed, started 
to happen, while the de-emphasis on food self-sufficiency has 
not. This 'privatisation' has, however, tended to retain most of 
the inefficiencies of a state system, whilst reducing the 
reSponsibi 1 i ty of the state to meet smallholder needs’; see for 
example, recent developments in Malawi (Kandoole and Kaluwa, 
1 9 8 8 ) .  • . . i
The hypothesis of this'paper is that it may bel best to accept the 
emphasis on food self-sufficiency and ' thej perceived need for 
state control and to concentrate , on , developing a state system 
which maximises economic efficiency within the given 
constraints. The inefficiencies - in resource ! allocation created, 
by the maintenance of pan—seasonal and pan—territorial pricesor 
of Government determined producer prices are ! not essential to 
the preservation of state marketing systems. jPrice policies can 
be designed which more closely reflect opportunity costs without 
loosing sight of other objectives including equity and food 
security. This paper, however will concentrate on effective and 
consistent market access and riot on prices which are addressed in 
Muir and Blackie (1988), Muir and Takavarasha (1988) and Muit—  
Leresche (1984). 1
Maize Marketing in" Eastern arid Southern Africa
There is surprising complementarity in the . institutional 
structure of maize marketing! systems in Eastern and Southern 
Africa. However, Kenya, Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
offer, rather different app1ications of this state managed 
marketing. These applications have had a significant effect on 
both the development of the maize sub-sector and. the development 
of rural markets which are so important in allowing for the 
specialisation essential to increasing, incomes.
Kenya, and to a lesser extent’? Tanzania, have a more diversified., 
and decentralised system of iftiarketing than Malawi., Co-operatives 
and parallel markets have played a more significant role in 
maize marketing in Kenya ■ and Tanzania than in Malawi.. Zambia 
provides the example of an African nation with a substantial and 
influential urban sector; the country has maintained a policy of 
low urban food prices for many years, a tradition that began with 
- ' the pre-independence development of the Copperbelt mining sector.
In Zimbabwe, -the interests of the large-scale sector have been 
- predominant. until recently with smallholders historically 
discouraged from active participation . in the market.
Probably the mos-t significanV outcome has been that the approach 
followed by Kenya has lead to the greater participation of 
, smallholders in formal maize- marketing, while. Tanzania has 
encouraged (unwittingly) the 1 development, of a major parallel 
market in foodgrains. Zambia:, with somewhat similar, agricultural’ 
policies to those in Tanzania, has precluded the development of 
the 'unofficial maize market through massive investments in 
: consumer maize subsidies. Malawi's centralised system has
■ allowed, the cross-rsubs id isation of commodity prices and 
encouraged resource transfer's from the smallholder sub-sector to 
the estates (Lele and Meyers*•' 1987) . Zimbabwe' s concentration on 
the large-scale sector relegated smallholders to self-
;■ sufficiency, low levels of specialisation and exchange and poor
access to markets. , '
Kenya Maize Marketing \
The Agricultural Production Marketing Act was introduced in i936 
; at the request of. white sett 1ers. The impetus for this
initiative was the fall in’ world commodity prices during the 
depression years. By 1945, marketing boards had been established 
to handle a variety of crops, including maize- (Livingstone and 
- Ord, 1981). The Defence Regulations in 1944 were introduced to -
control further the movement and sales of maize nationally. - In 
the early days of controlled maize marketing n Kenya, national 
■ \ . prices were aligned with - international prices. From the ',1950s,
' -h.owever., national prices fell below export parity, and there was
■ active price discrimination ’ against smallholders (Hesse 1 mark, 
1977) . In the mid 1950s', many of the administrative functions ,
' of the national marketing boards were' decentralised.to provincial
6board?. Management problems associated with proliferation of 
marketing agencies led to the es tab 1 i shmen t! o-f a single Maize and 
General Produce Board in 1966 (Muir, 1982a). The Board regulated 
the movement and. price o-f maize nationally, with farmers having 
the option of selling direct to a Board depot or through a 
cooperative agent. Direct sales to the Board depot required the 
farmer to deliver a minimum quantity. Ini 1979, the Board was 
merged with the Wheat Board to form the National Cereals and 
Produce Board (NCPB). The most important functions of the Board 
were to ensure the equitable distribution of maize throughout the 
country, to find markets for surplus production or to arrange the 
timely importation of maize in periods of shortage. The failure 
of the Board to fulfill these responsibi 1 ii ties resulted in a 
growing parallel market in :• maize. In 1977 the Board failed to 
purchase large quantities of the maize . produced and there was a 
noticeable withdrawal of smallholders from the market in 
subsequent years (Muir-Leresche.1984). In 1980, when there was a 
serious maize shortage, actual farm prices for maize were four 
times greater that the official price (Muir, 1982a). A major 
influence of the Board has • • been to restrict the.movement of 
maize rather than to control private sales. Pinckney, 1988, 
notes that while some private movement of' maize does take place, 
it is insufficient to arbitrage price differentials between areas 
of major surplus and deficit.V' '
A major problem with the NCPB was its inaccessibi1ity to 
sma11 holders. Thus a significant proportion ' of' the maize trade 
was being missed by the NCPB, particularly as, with the growing 
uptake of hybrid maize by sma11 ho1ders, national smallholder 
maize production grew. A Presidential Directive in 1980 
instructed the NCPB to establish buying centres closer to areas 
of smallholder . production to encourage smallholders to 
participate in the formal maize market. Previously, smallholders 
had either to take their produce to NCPB depots near the main 
cities, or to market at a discount through the cooperative buying 
agents (Jabara, 1985). =v
Heyer ejt a_l_ (1976) point out that in .1966 the NCPB handled only 
about 107. of the national maize crop. In . spite of the 
Presidential Directive in 19B0., the NCPB had only increased its 
market share to about 45 - 507. by the early 1980s, with an 
average growth in sales to1 the Board between 1970 and 1985 of 
2.47.; a statistically insignificant growth rate (Lele and Meyers, 
1987; Jabara, 1985). Until recently, the Kenya Farmers 
Association (a cooperative of large-scale producers) acted as the 
agent for the NCPB for grain purchases. This responsibility has 
now been transferred to the Kenya' Grain Growers Association, 
which includes all producers. As Lele and Meyers observe, this 
approach is both more participatory and more inefficient.
Tlpe debate on maize marketing in Kenya continues. The . matter is 
lent further urgency by thd’ increasing costs of maize marketing. 
In the 1970s, the NCPB more or less covered its own costs of 
operation; between •1979 and. 1984, the board absorbed from 10 to
207. of. the Ministry, of Agriculture and Livestock Development 
•budget (Pinckney, 198B). h'!This rise in operating deficit by the 
NCPB coincided with a general increase in the national budget 
deficit and thus the. boardhas come under increasing1y-critica1 
scrutiny in the past few years. Pinckney observes:
, “CwhileD the board is not the most efficient of
organisations, .... it has been assigned an impossible 
' task. The board is supposed to buy whatever, is offered
at a price over which it has no control; sell whatever 
•is demanded at a ;second price over which it has no 
control; export and import only when given approval by 
'l cabinet, not when it seems profitable to do so; and
store whatever the ■ (end -result of all these other 
decisions requires". •
Pinckney concludes that the board is forced to bend the law by 
allowing stock .levels to 7 influence its buying and selling 
operations. It is slow to . buy periods of, .surplus and may , in 
addition, offer less than ithe official . price. Board sales, are 
restricted in times and arias of deficit in order to maintain 
stocks. Thus board '’operations actually increase price
variability for both-rural c'onsumers and producers of , maize, as 
board staff try to ensure that operating costs are kept as low as 
possible.
Tanzania Maize Marketing
The literature on maize marketing in pre-independence Tanzania 
is sparse - par ticu 1 ar 1 y ; in comparison to the multiplicity of 
Studies on post-independen?ce Tanzania. There were sporadic 
limited attempts to encourage European settlement, but settlers 
were never .a consistent major fqrce in the territory. Of the 
48.7 million hectares of arable land in Tanzania, only 1.3 
million hectares were under settler occupation by 1959 (Kahama, 
Maliyamkono and Wells, 1986). The overriding concern during the 
colonial period was to ensure that the territory was not a burden 
on the British economy, and wherever possible, to extract, a 
surplus.
At Independence, the estate sector, accounted for 357. of exports 
by value and 407.. of marketed output. Sisal was the main export 
crop, with estates being- the predominant producers of coffee,- 
tea, tobacco, sugar and wheat. Smallholders produced most of the- 
cotton, cashewnQts and oilseeds, while also generating sufficient 
surplus of maize for. their own heeds and those of the urban areas 
(Amani et a 1 1987). As a means of improving the efficiency of 
smallholder production, the!] colonial authorities encouraged the 
formation.of marketing cooperatives. From. 1945 to 1952, the 
number of . cooperatives rose from 79 to 474, and smallholder 
production rose accordinglyh For example, cotton production rose
8by an average of '107. annually between 1945 and 1960, while coffee, 
production rose by 237. over the. decade -following 1945. In last 
years of colonial rule, the cooperatives were to become important 
foci for social and political development (Kahama, Maiiyamkono 
and Wells., 1986).
Before independence, most trade in food crops was undertaken by 
private traders. These traders purchased directly from
sma11 holders and sold'the produce either directly to consumers or 
to wholesalers or. brokers. Between 1946 and 1.957, all commercial 
quantities of maize had to "1 be sold, to .the Grain Storage 
Department. An attractive maize price quickly led to surplus 
production which had to be exported at a loss. In consequence, 
the monopoly of the Grain Storage Department,was eliminated in 
1957 and private trading in maize resumed (Amani et_ a_l_ 1987)
Drought in the 1960/61 year brought^ sharp rises in urban maize 
prices. The 1962 Agricu1turai: Products Act abolished private
trading in food grains and replaced them by cooperative unions. 
These unions soldi1 their produce to the National Agricultural 
Products Board (NAPB) and the movement of significant quantities 
of grain required the approval of the board. The rapid expansion 
of the cooperative union movement was not without its problems. 
There were insufficient numbers of management and financial staff 
to operate them, and, for those areas ofi the country where 
cooperatives were an innovation, the cooperatives were as much 
imposed upon farmers' as were the parastatals thjat succeeded them. 
The evidence on the overall record of this i first cooperative 
system is conflicting. Some commentators maintain that, in spite 
of some inefficiency and petty corruption,; the system was 
reasonably open to local scrutiny and control. Even in those 
cases where local participation was at a low: level, there was 
only limited opportunity for abuse (Ellis :et. al_» 1985). By 
contrast, Amani et. al_ observe that1 many cooperatives were 
"inefficient, incurred financial losses and delayed or never 
fully paid peasants."
The National Milling Corporation (NMC) was fo.rmed in 1968 to 
manufacture and process the commodities, purchased by the NAPB. 
In 1973, the NMC took over the internal cerea,l procurement and 
grain trading functions from the NAPB. With the dissolution of 
the cooperative unions in 1976,; NMC also took 1 over the vjLllage 
level grain procurement functions of the cooperative unions. 
'Both Amani et a 1 and Ellis ejt ajj point out that the cooperative 
unions Were dissolved more for their incompatibility with the 
policy of compulsory vi11agisation rather than for any insoluble 
defects in their operations. . Thus, by the end of the 1970s, NMC 
was responsible for village level procurement of ;food grains, as 
well as for their transportation, storage, processing and 
national distribution. It was arlso responsible for grain imports 
and exports, the pperation of famine relief,, managing the 
national strategic grain reserve, plus a variety of other 
assorted activities. 1 ' ,.
- 1 ■ it
There were three critical ; flaws in the parastatal marketing 
system* which succeeded the cooperative unions (Ellis e_t aJL_) . All 
impact on the development of ...'the maize industry in Tanzania:
1 . The parastatal authorities had the responsibility for
i crop development as; well as for crop marketing. Thus,
they were required to undertake research, extension and 
j , project implementation for the commodities within their
. mandate. The implied switch in the financing of such 
activities -  ^from^general revenue to a direct charge 
^ on crop m a r k e t i n g w a s  never explicitly deal t with in
government .policy , f; al though the effects on parastatal 
costs were substantial . v ■' '
.2. : The cooperatives had handled all crops within their
location. The parastatals were, in contrast,
responsible for a commodity on a .national basis. Thus 
each parastatal had to develop the capaci ty to col lect 
and move i ts . own commod i ty ac ross the country 
(irrespective of quantities available for purchase in 
. ' : . ; ..'.th’e.y'dif-feren't areas) . The outcome was an escalation of 
overhead costs as each parastatal built up its 
transport and procurement network independently. In 
areas where production of the commodity of concern to a 
parastatal was low, this resulted in high unit costs.
3. Parastatals handling export crops derived the farm 
I price by first deducting their operating cost from
: export realizations. .Thus the farm price had only a
; ■ . tenuous link with "international markets, and farmers
bore the full brunt of both parastatal cost levels and 
dec lines in the world marked pi ice. The fact that this 
did not happen in ,|the case of domestic food grains was 
__ due primarily to concern's for national food security 
and low urban food prices. ' - - 1 .
By the late’ 1970s, the costs of the par astatal ) marketing system 
had become enormous, and, as importantTy, the volumes of crops 
handled by them were declining sharply. Ellis e_t a 1 document 
that by the.early. 1980s, th6 ) crop marketing authorities has a 
debt in excess of 8 bi11 ion Tanzania shi11ings. They Were, in 
consequence, a major force in the expansion of domestic rnoney 
supply , and thus, in domestic--inf lation.. ^
In 1980, the Tan z 
cooperative,marke 
parastataIs have 
reg i on a 1 on ions, 
trade with,, in 1983. 
across administra 
and Meyers, 1987 
para 11e 1 market i 
increased by 1 . 
increased by 1.97.
ania government decided to return to a sy 
ting. Most of the marketing, functions 
been returned to the cooperative societ 
There has been some 1ibera1isation of i
the movement of maize on private
tive boundaries being increased to 450 kg 
). Despite these changes, thereremains- 
n; food grain's. Official maize purchases 
17. annua 11y between 1970 and 1985. 
annua 11y , reflecting a growth rate in n
stem of 
of the 
ies and 
nterna1 
account 
s ( L e 1 e 
a ’ major, 
by NMC 
'Sales 
et sale
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Meyers, 1987). j Amani et a 1 record 
and 1984, only : about 257. o-f maize 
channels.
o-f 0.87. per year (Lel'e and 
that between the! late 1970s 
went through the official els. The; picture has changed 
somewhat in the immediate past, with good| cropping years in 
1985/86 and 1986/B7'. In national terms, the i o-ff icia 1 price rose 
from 507. of. the open market price in 19B4/85 to 78.87. in 198.6/07. 
Official purchases for maize , have risen in[consequence by some 
407. annually over the period 1984 to 1987. Irp the remote regions 
of Ruvuma and Rukwa, where over 307 of official purchases are 
made, official prices . exceeded?! open market prices during the past 
few cropping seasons but: the transport subsidy involved
excesssive losses to NMC (Amani et al). I
Malawi Maize Marketing
1arge-sc ale . agri cul ture
i.a1 Fjroduc t.ion in Mu tare
ma j or - inf 1 uence on
oc cupy some 0 .5 mi 11 ion
rs have acc es s - to some
an d John son , 1985 ) . The
Although, as in Tanzania, the area unc 
is relatively small, large-stale.comma 
has had, and. continues to have, a. 
agricultural policy. Todays estates
hectares of land, while smallholder farme  
6.7 million hectares (Manda'i Dzowel 
abjective of the colonial administration, from the imposition of 
colonial rule in 1891 was to encourage African employment on 
settler estates./ However, the appearance ofj markets for food 
grains, in the form of urban areas, schools land estates,:led to 
the rapid expansion of , . smallholder maize. production. This 
situation., with not only the urban area^ but also the large 
estates, being dependent.upon maize surplus gqown by smallholders 
•has persisted to the present day (Howell,j Antony and Hewitt, 
1987)/ From 1953 to 19.63 j Malawi was part of |the Central African 
Federation, and thus settler influence frojm both Zimbabwe and 
Zambia had ^n important impact on developm.ent policy in Malawi 
generally. With respect to smallholder maize jmarkets, this meant 
that the state acted primarily .as a residual; buyer. After, a
severe famine in 1949,. an attractive pricing regime for maize 
ensured a regular maize surplus. However, - maize marketing
remained, along with that of most other commodities, largely the' 
province of Asian traders. Since independence, the Asian
influence on marketing ha's Virtually been eliminated . by
restricting Asians to the larger 
type and location of Asian-owned
towns and 
businesses.
by , controlling the
The only marketing board /in Malawi isj the Agricultural 
Development and Marketing Corporation ADMARC [(which was created 
from the Farmers' Marketing Board in 1971). Unlike the marketing
and Tanzania;;- ADMARC is responsible for the 
smallholder drops. Because ADMARC is a trader 
commodities, it has been possible to cross-
boards in Kenya 
purchase of . all 
in a number of
VI
i
subsidise the commodities in which it deals.1 This has enabled 
ADMARC to avoid some of the severe financial problems that have 
beset other state marketing boards in the rbgion. ■ It was only 
when ADMARC was hit by a ■doub1e blow , of depressed international 
tobacco prices, and a government decision to raise the maize price 
by 617. in 1981, that the agency ran into financial difficulties..
Until recently, ADMARC . maintained 72 major markets for the 
various crops, as well -as over 900 seasonal buying stations. 
Some of the latter were mobile and periodic, visiting particular 
markets . on predetermined days (Muir, 1982b). . Under a market 
liberalisation policy,,many of the seasonal buying stations are 
to be closed starting in the 1988 cropping season. These include 
many of the.most remote stations, on the unrealistic assumption 
that. these will be serviced by. private traders. The
-"liberalisation" was prompted by large losses in surplus years. -
One of ADMARC's' logistical problems and attractions has, been its 
ability to pay the. farmer in cash as soon as the crop is 
delivered. Also, although ADMARC is the sole legal maize trader 
and . there are offical "restrictions on the movement of maize 
nationally, there have been continuing and. significant private 
maize trading activities. Typically these are carried out by 
small traders operating a .single vehicle : = . ADMARC, therefore, 
unlike counterparts in Kenya and Tanzania' did not actively 
attempt to maximise its monopoly power with respect to .maize,; the 
liberal interpretation of its 1ega1.position allowed the supply 
of maize to non-maize growing areas to be supplied by small 
traders, operating over long distances (Kando.ole e_t a_l_, 1987). 
The concern of ADMARC would appear to have been to act as a 
stabilising influence on "'the national maize market through the 
acquisition of strategic r'eserves. ADMARC maintains warehouses 
throughout the country ‘taith an aggregate capacity of.300,000 
tonnes. Pt modern silo complex in Lilongwe can store a further 
180,000 tonnes.
I’
Although ADMARC; has a: well deserved reputation as an effective 
development and marketing agency, its apparent efficiency was 
largely a result of having ample operating surpluses from taxing 
peasant tobacco sales (Muir, 1982b),. Of more concern has been 
the bias against the involvement of smallholders in fpigh value 
export crop production. This has caused some rethinking, of 
ADMARC's role. ADMARC between:about 1964 and 1984 Changed from a
1 It is interesting to note that Zimbabwe adopted a
rather different approach to cross-subsidisation through the 
creation of an overall Agricultural Marketing Authority with 
separate commodity Boards; for a description of these, see 
Blackie, 1986 and 1987).
detailed description of private trading in 
Government, 1983 and Kandoole . et_ al_ 1987.
. j ’ ' 'I ' \1
2 for a more
Malawi, see Malawi.
1
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market stablishing agency to a revenue and dev 
one. For; example, during the, period 1964-6, on 
producer, income was retained, ’ by the board. 1
71, about 227. of potential producer income was 
proportion had risen to 357 during 1972 - 75 < L 
The Malawi strategy is an interesting one 
similar agencies in the region, it has a 
extracting taxes from the smallholder sector.
Livingstone points out, is that some of the r 
from smallholders have been retained within 
sector. This general bias against smallholder 
agricul ture per .se has served to give Malawi a surprisingly 
resilient agricultural economy, but withja substantially narrower 
base than that of Kenya. Sma i 1 hoi der par tic i paltion in the market 
is noticeably less than in Kenya, although with respect to maize, 
recent events have shown that smallholders are quick aind eager to 
the market when maize producer prices- rise.
e 1opment financing 
ly 77 of potential 
n the period 1969- 
held back. This 
ivings tone, 1985)>
since, like many, 
cted as a means of 
The difference, as 
esourc.es wi t hd rawn 
the agricultural 
, but not against
enter
In 1987, the maize market has been officially opened to private 
trade through the Agriculture (General Purpose) Act. However, 
the overall effect on the maize trade is 1ikely to be slight , 
since the new marketing, regulations are hot conducive to large 
scale investment in marketing infrastructure. Marketing licenses 
are issued on an annual basis only, and participation in the. 
market is' restricted to Malawi nationals. The control on exports 
is maintained through the existing licensing system. Thus, it is 
•likely that there will b e . more small trader activity in the 
market plate, but no major challenge to ADMARG‘s dominance. As 
noted by Lele.there is likely to be a negative impact on remote 
producers and consumers.
Zambia Maize Marketing
Zambia, like Kenya, was strongly influenced in- its early 
agricultural policy by the need :to attract' and | linaintain. a settler 
farming population.3 , Consequently, much of the development of 
the maize marketing /system in Zambia :is\similar;to that in Kenya
here, Governmen tand does riot warrarit repeating in detail
control over maize marketing started with the Great Depression in 
the- 1930s and has continued,' with on 1y marginal changes, almost 
to the present day."
The important difference with 
Zambia, as opposed to the other 
that, the internal price of
respect to 
territories, 
mal.i^ e to
maize marketing in 
analysed here, is 
has beenconsumers
consistently kept below the cost of imported maize (Dodge, 1977).
•3Dbdge, - 1977, . gives ’ a . comprehensive account of the
development of. agricu 1 tura 1 /policy in pre- and post-independence 
Zambia. ■.
■I
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Smallholders suffered a particular disadvantage under this 
arrangement pre—independence,,.'as- ■ their maize prices were, over 
several long periods, set’ below those of the settlers. The 
overall objective o-f this pblicy was to reduce the price o-f 
labour in the Copperbel't Jmining sector j the mines were major 
employers of labour, and copper, -for many years, was the primary 
source of growth in the Zambian economy. During, the period 1965 
to 1973, nearly half the central government revenue came from 
mining (Ellis et al_'1985). ’ The situation in. Zambia reflects the 
'Dutch disease' problem later to emerge in Nigeria with the oil 
boom (see Aboyade, 1986). ' ^
The bias against smal1 holders continued after independence. 
Dodge, 1977, has shown that real urban incomes rise consistently 
in the. first decade since [independence, while those of farmers 
fell . sharply. The result has : been the highest level of
urbanisation in the .Southern and Eastern region . of Africa, 
together with stagnating agricultural . production (Ellis et al, 
1985, estimated, that 477. of the population of Zambia was in
urban areas in 1985). Ain interesting effect of Zambia's
agricultural policy has been the emergence of maize as the 
dominant national crop, both in physical and value terms. Over 
the period 1964 to 1968, maize represented / an average of 617. of
. total.'marketed- production. This, increased to an average of 767
by the period 1973 to 1977. Zambia remained largely self-
sufficient in maize until the mid 1970s, mainly as a result of 
this shift in aggregate maize production. The crisis came with 
the collapse of the international cooper market; mineral 
revenues fell from 577. of all tax revenue in 1974 to virtually 
zero in 1977.- ’ The resulting shortages in government revenues and 
foreign exchange led to massive reduction in the availability in 
imported items., Maize production, which relies heavily on 
imported chemical fertilizers for reasonable yields on Zambian 
soils, fell sharply. while- there was an. average growth in.
marketed maize of 27.27. over the period 1970 to 1975, the
following' five year period saw a reduction in marketed yields of
6.17 (Ellis et aj^ , 1985) . P
' - ' 'Vi ■ ... ’ \
Prior to 1985, as- elsewhere, in the Southern and1 Eastern Africa 
region, the government marketing bourd, (latterly, known as the 
National Agricultural Marketing Board or (NAMBOARD), had a legal 
monopoly on interdistrict sales of. maize. Private trading in
maize between districts, was Panhibited, not so much by NAMBOARD's 
legal , powers but by the heavy,]. subsidy on maize meal which made 
private trading una t trac t i vef, ( E IT is et a 1 , 1985). Thus Zambia
provides yet another example,of how the same basic structure of a 
central state marketing- board can result in a highly specific 
outcome, depending oh the other agricultural policies in place. 
In the case on Zambia, private trading and the parallel market in 
maize is of minor importance. Ellis ejt a_l_, ^1985, estimated
conservatively that removal of the maize consumer subsidy would 
cause the maize, meal price to rise by 50 to 607.; subsequent 
events showed the Zambia government raising meal prices by 1007. 
but then being forced to retract the measure due to urban
i.
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consumer pressure. The budget constraints -faced by the Zambian 
government, mean that it is j unable to continue to meet' the \ 
national maize subsidy. For examp1e , .the Zambian Prime Minister 
in 198.5 reported that, in spite of overdrafts of -ZK60 million 
■from, the parastal Agricultural Finance Cdmpany, NAMBOARD'was 
still ZK141 million short o-f the -funds necessa'ry to purchase the 
1985 maize harvest (Ellis et_ al . 1985). .!
As in Tanzania, dissatisfaction with the ; performance of the 
parastatal maize marketing system has led to a series -of 
experiments with marketing structures in an attempt to improve 
marketing efficiency. These are well documented in Ellis et.a 1, 
1985, Dodge,1 1977, and Dodge, 1979. Thje problem of how to 
eliminate the maize consumer subsidy in, a -period of serious 
national stringency, and wh.en urban employment' and inco.me are. 
contracting, remains intractable. Yet it isi this very subsidy 
that threatens the viability of an agriculture led strategy to 
replace the lost revenues from copper. i
S
Zimbabwe Maize Marketing I. ’ ■ j ■ ■
A single channel marketing system under statutory organisations, 
operates for most commodities and producer | prices are 
administered for all the more important crops with the exception 
of tobacco, sugar and horticultural products. The market
structure is not normally characterized by competition with 
either co-operatives or parallel markets a n d [the private sector 
is restricted to specified products and functions.
Government intervention was initiated by white J  farmers during the 
Depression and their:maize sal^s were subsidised by consumers and 
peasantfarmers (Muir-Lereschef 1984). The Grain Marketing Board 
(CMS) controls the purchase, fat government-fixed prices) of all 
food commodities including maize which1 it jt.hen , sells (at a 
controlled price) :to private tector millers land oil expressors 
from designated -Zone Centres. The GMB is the [sole legal trader- 
in Area A (most of the commercial farming areas) but free local 
trade is.permitted within the boundaries designated. Area B (the 
marginal commercial cropping- areas and, al 1| communally-owned 
lands). This has effectively" .1imited legal [exchanges between 
surplus and deficit communal ' areas unless they have contiguous 
boundaries. , . I .
Large-scale farmers deliver direct to the GMB depots, whereas 
^peasant farmers normally have to rely on i third. parties to 
purchase and transport their grain. The poor j infrastructure in
the communal farming areas is the result of both political^ and 
economic factors. The previous government made: little attempt to 
encourage surplus production from these areas and concentrated 
investment in the large—scale sector. At the same time the
widely dispersed, small producers concentrated mainly in. marginal 
■ cropping areas makes it uneconomic to invest in large fixed
1purchasing depots in most- of these areas. Of the ten-fold 
increase in marketed output . from the communal areas since 
Independence, the greatest proportion is from a small minority of 
farmers located in Region II. (Stanning, 1987; Muir and 
Takavarasha, 1988).
The Government is under considerable political ' pressure to 
increase access to official market'channels in the communal areas 
where the most common practice for peasant farmers has been to 
rely on appointed agents of the GMB. These agents are supposed 
to pay the official price less prescribed handling and transport 
fees. Problems have arisen with grade determination and the 
deduction of unreasonably high handling fees. Some of the
problems associated with agents- would be alleviated if, instead 
of licencing agents, access ;"was opened in order to increase 
competition - minimum deliveries could be required to reduce GMB 
Costs. Prior to 1979 there , was a levy on all sales through
official channels from the communal areas. This tax. was strong 1y 
resented as discriminatory since it did. not apply to large-scale 
. farmers and was a form o.f forced saving by people who had no 
control over, its disposal. ■.
For many years the GMB served the interest of large—scale farmers 
although in recent years it has increasingly served the interests 
of urban consumers. It is .designed to handle large surpluses 
from large-scale farms for processing and distribution in the 
major urban centres. It is /not designed to distribute food to 
deficit rural areas and nor is it geared to collect small
surpluses from a. large number o.f widely dispersed farmers. It 
has, however, been called upon explicitly to service these
farmers since Independence which has added significantly to 
trading losses. Initially primary rural depots were established 
in maize surplus communal areas, - small bag collection depots 
with very limited storage capacity. By- 1986, 17 primary depots
were operational (Kupfuma, 1987).
The depots are too expensive to establish throughout the communal 
areas and a collection-point system has been implemented which 
involves receiving and transporting the maize but no grading or 
payment. Collection points are established annually on a daily, 
weekly or monthly basis, depending on throughput. .The bags are 
receipted, marked and then forwarded to • the nearest depot for 
grading and payment arrangement’s . The farmers pay. $1 per bag 
transport from collection point./to depot' with the GMB subsidising 
additional transport and handling costs. The system has the 
advantage of being season-specific and of obtaining economies of 
scale in transport. Kupfuma estimated that the collection points 
reduced total transport costs b^ * between $20 and $50. per tonne in 
1985 depending on distance, with savings to farmers much higher 
as partial transport subsidies were also involved. Despite these 
advantages, the collection points remain unattractive to peasant 
farmers because of the limited grading facilities and added 
del.ays' in payment. ■ n' ( -  .
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Policy Implications
The evidence above suggests that despite the desire to involve 
smallholders, mare closely w-ith official maize markets, current 
maize marketing/;”, .polrici^s are. inherently unfriendly'1 to 
smallholders and are, in ] -fact, inimical to both growth and 
equity. The market ' imperfections arising -from a situation with 
widely scattered, small producers and a poor transport network; 
the extreme weather induced yield -fluctuations and the political 
need for control of food marketing; make it extremely unlikely 
that an effective private '"marketing system Jean be implemented. 
Child, Muir and Blackie, 1985, have shown that a partially 
decontrolled system could' reduce state costs without losing 
effective control of national food supplies and at the same time 
help protect producers an’d consumers from extreme price 
fluctuations. Even this partial decontrol, however, may not be 
politically feasible.
Although existing .public food marketing agencies are subject to 
the inefficiencies 1 of any bureaucratic system, these can be 
reduced without affecting state control of sensitive commodities. 
These agencies were originally designed to serve the needs of 
estate farmers, and/or urban consumers. It is the simple
expansion of such agencies 'vto serve smallholders that underlies 
their poor performance in the region. The ] efficiency of such 
agencies can be significant1y improved if their design is altered 
in accordance with their expanded functions. ;If smallholders are 
to form an increasingly important component of national 
agricultural economies, access to markets and 'a consistent policy 
for marketing' institutions is essential.
IMarketing and pricing policies must not be changed in response to 
short—term supply positions. A consequence of government-set
prices responding to the previous year's supply is. a mirror of 
the classical cobweb model,5 with the. trend explosive (Muir and 
Blackie (1988). Evidence from Kenya and Malawi indicates that if 
marketing services are erratic there is a reluctance to rely on a 
market where purchase's are limited in surplus years and in 
deficit years only the ur^an areas are serviced. Zimbabwe shows 
the reluctance of "farmers to market through channels which delay 
payment. The dangers of the current movement to "privatisation" 
is that full free competition will not be implemented;,the state 
will- retain control of the most lucrative markets and the 
periphery will be left unserviced.
Smallholders have come to expect market access as a right and 
emphasis is placed on building large, permanent maize depots1. 
There . are very few areas where returns would 'warrant the 
investment, especially as often the depots, are not full markets 
but rather confined to the purchasing alone of selected 
commodities. Malawi has been the most successful of the
countries in ensuring reasonable access and: most farmers are
within ten kilometers of the ADMARC supported sales and
purchasing points. The "collection points" system in Zimbabwe is 
the most economic o-f existing systems (Kupfuma, 1987) being 
operated in Zimbabwe but the -failure to attract -farmers appears 
to be related to the lack o-T,grading -facilities and delays in 
paymen t.
Governments need to establish institutions which will increase 
market access, ensure stability and at the same time improve 
market e-f f1c iency. Mobile ■ collection, agencies operated on a 
periodic basis, in association with other government services and 
the private' sector would. ! not only help to increase local 
specialisation and exhange. (Reynolds 1981). but would reduce 
national transport costs. The opportunity costs o-f the transport 
would be zero or very low. 'The state agencies would also be in a 
stronger position to lobby for road improvement and maintenance.
There is a reluctance on the: part of the agencies to implement 
systems which are radically different from those provided for, 
the estate sector and at. the same time the smallholders are 
demanding access to the same level of servies provided to that 
sector. There are no simple*' solutions which will both help to 
reduce state expenditure and at the same time encourage 
smallholders to participatemore actively in a market economy. 
The . development of local markets which will ; encourage 
special istion is so important to economic development, however, 
that more resources should be invested' in developing and 
implementing appropriate marketing strategies. The large 
deficits of' the parastatal marketing institutions can be reduced 
whilst increasing market ■ access to smallholders by designing 
institutions which directly address the constraints without 
subsidising producers, consumers or the state bureaucracy. It is 
important to identify the major constraints to market access and 
address these directly. . ;
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